Has Xi Jinping stretched China too far? I’m not a political analyst, nor one who meddles in international affairs, nor, do I get invited to TV debate shows to prove my lung capacity or intellectual holiday. This article is just a piece of observation and an interpretation to those observations made over a period of about one year. In this article, the subject is the matter.
Xi came to power in 2012. The economic growth in china has maintained a roughly steady profile under Xi. There’s an agenda on display. “The great Chinese dream”. It is an agenda which aims at putting the People’s Republic as a strong nation with a global footprint or even global leadership role. It ignores the thought of “China must bide it’s time and hide its strength” as Xi transcends to lifetime ownership of Chinese leadership.
Xi came to power in 2012. The economic growth in china has maintained a roughly steady profile under Xi. There’s an agenda on display. “The great Chinese dream”. It is an agenda which aims at putting the People’s Republic as a strong nation with a global footprint or even global leadership role. It ignores the thought of “China must bide it’s time and hide its strength” as Xi transcends to lifetime ownership of Chinese leadership.
This piece studies some of the recent initiative of the Chinese establishment in relation to the environment she stages in. The changes are evident both internally as well as outside the country. To refer a few, ever since the arrival of Xi on the scene, there has been a total clampdown on opposition of any kind. Absolute censorship is in place and there is no scope for dissent, no options or opinions against the party leadership are welcome. Detention of critics and purging of officials closes the challenge. In this environment, Xi’s elevation and the mute acceptance of a lifelong ownership was any way a foregone conclusion.
Let’s see a few external initiatives. Firstly, one has to willingly accept that the initiatives are not necessarily of the ‘People’s republic’. These belong in all true sense to one man who claims lifetime ownership of the Chinese administration and has assumed it upon himself to elevate the country to a “Strong nation” and a “World power”. Anything or person which comes in the way must not do so.
85% of Hambantota for example, at over $360 mn is funded by the China Exim bank. The port, not operationally viable for the Sri Lankans is now leased for 99 years against a debt-equity swap to China Merchant Port Holding Co (CM Port) which would still need several hundred millions of dollars to make it go.
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is yet another staggering project involving over 40 nations where a connectivity network is being set up comprising ports, Air ports, roads, railway, highway, power stations, pipelines, canals, dams and what have you, all networked for seamless operations across continents.
On the geographical scale it is a herculean effort stretching across Asia, Europe, Africa, the Indian Ocean, Persian Gulf and the Pacific. The overtures to Nepal Bhutan and Myanmar, the militarisation of the Spratly Islands in South China Sea, overseas military base at Djibouti all at break neck speed surely is humongous.
The eventual costs both in terms of money (Which may run in $ Trillions) and the consequential collateral environmental challenges are not yet fully established. However, one thing that is duly in place and clear is the object of the exercise viz. to position China as the centre of economic, political and finally military might globally. The stepping stones in this initiative are states which are weak and can be impressed upon. Pakistan for example, entrapped in the benevolence of the China-Pak Economic Corridor (CPEC).
In an effort of such gargantuan proportions who will assume the responsibility? Who will ensure the quality control, the corruption monitoring, vested interests of small and middle and sometimes large and very large operators? Things may go one way as long as the buck stops at one person. But who will address the aspirations of rising potential leaders in the countries involved, riding on the tsunami of development? If the overall credit and the seat of global economic and military control is the proposer of the initiative, why would smaller operators comply?
With a large portion of their 1.4 billion population employed professionally along the length and breadth of the project, a Chinese influx across BRI would have the potential to alter regional demographics as is evident along CPEC, or even Uighur region for that matter. The local aspirations may lead to conflicting and more often than not inter-personal social rivalries. Imposition of alien cultural values amounting to socio-cultural aggression can also not be ruled out.
Since there is no start date (many smaller on-going projects have also been brought under the same umbrella) or an end date ,mapping the economic figures of a project of this size would be hilarious if one were to do it.
And what happens after Xi? He is human after all. And it is his dream. With no clear succession trail in terms of leadership known to the world yet, what if…? Would it all fall apart? Would the investments made by China globally collapse? What if the next incumbent doesn’t wish to dump more concrete into the Spratly Islands chain or diverges from the South China Sea effort? What if the next administration in Pakistan refuses to toe the Chinese line and the Jihadi network takes over the reins giving two hoots to CEPC? With terrorism in the Middle east, North Africa, Central, South and South east Asia if the loans extended by Chinese banks to countries invested end up as bad debts?
These are questions which have been plaguing my mind along with several others. And just as I said earlier, “has China bitten more than can be chewed”? The subject is the matter.
